Abduction is an inference mechanism where given a knowledge base and some observations, the reasoner tries to nd hypotheses which together with the knowledge base explain the observations. A reasoning based on such an inference mechanism is referred to as abductive reasoning. Given a theory and some observations, by ltering the theory with the observations, we mean selecting only those models of the theory that entail the observations. Entailment with respect to these selected models is referred to as lter entailment. In this paper we give necessary and su cient conditions when abductive reasoning with respect to a theory and some observations is equivalent to the corresponding lter entailment. We then give su ciency conditions for particular knowledge representation formalisms that guarantee that abductive reasoning can indeed be done through ltering and present examples from the knowledge representation literature where abductive reasoning is done through ltering. We extend the notions of abductive reasoning and lter entailment to allow preferences among explanations and models respectively and give conditions when they are equivalent. Finally, we give a weaker notion of abduction and abductive reasoning and show the later to be equivalent to lter entailment under less restrictive conditions.
Introduction and Motivation
Abduction is an inference mechanism where given a knowledge base and some observations, the reasoner tries to nd hypotheses which together with the knowledge base explain the observations. These hypotheses are then referred to as explanations of the observations with respect to the knowledge base. Abduction was introduced by Peirce Pei58, Pei92] in the beginning of the century and has been used in various AI applications PMG98, Poo89] Although, abduction is often used as a`backward reasoning' method where observations are explained, we can also do`forward reasoning' using abduction. This happens when, certain new conclusions are entailed by each of the explanations 1 (or each of the preferred explanations) of an observation together with the knowledge base. By new conclusions we mean conclusions that are not entailed by the knowledge base without using abduction. Moreover, these conclusions may not be entailed by the theory obtained by simply adding the observations to the knowledge base. The following example makes this point clear.
Example 1 Consider the knowledge base T represented by the following logic program:
fly(X) bird(X) fly(X) aeroplane(X) haswings(X) aeroplane(X) haswings(X) bird(X) Now, suppose we observe ffly(tweety)g. If we would like to explain this observation in terms of the predicates bird and aeroplane, then this observation has three explanations: E 1 = fbird(tweety)g, E 2 = faeroplane(tweety)g, E 3 = fbird(tweety); aeroplane(tweety)g.
It is easy to see that for i = 1; 2; 3, T E i entails the new conclusion haswings(tweety), which is not entailed by T. However, the theory T ffly(tweety)g obtained by simply adding the observation to the theory, does not entail haswings(tweety).
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We refer to the entailment of haswings(tweety) from the theory T and the observation ffly(tweety)g as abductive entailment and reasoning with respect to this entailment relation as abductive reasoning. Such entailments were used in DDS93, Dun93] while formalizing reasoning about actions using abductive logic programming and one such entailment was formally de ned { using generalized stable models KM90,EK88] { with respect to abductive logic programming in BG94]. Shanahan in Chapter 17 of his book Sha97] refers to such entailments as`knowledge assimilation'.
Several researchers San89, Sha97, Lif95] have used a di erent approach to assimilate observations. In this approach observations are assimilated into a theory by selecting only those models of the theory that entail the observations. Note that since the theory could be in a non-monotonic language, this is not same as adding the observations to the theory. Sandewall, the rst (to the best of our knowledge) to have used this in a non-probabilistic setting San89] refers to this as ltering. (In a probabilistic setting the notion of Bayesian conditioning is very similar Gef99] .)
The goal of this paper is to study the relationship between these two approaches to assimilate observations. But since the ltering approach is comparatively new and less well-known in non-probabilistic settings, although quite pervasive in the recent research on reasoning about actions, we rst give a brief overview of its use.
Use of ltering in knowledge representation: a brief overview
Three research groups that have extensively used ltering or an equivalent notion in their recent research are:
{ Sandewall and his group at Linkoping University.
{ Shanahan and his colleagues at Imperial College.
{ The Texas action group at the University of Texas at Austin and the University of Texas at El Paso.
Use of ltering at Linkoping University
Filtering was rst introduced by Sandewall in San89], his IJCAI 89 paper titled`Filter preferential entailment for the logic of action in almost continuous worlds'.
In that paper he de nes a binary function Filter whose inputs are a non-empty set of formulas representing observations (? 0 ), and a set of models (S), and de nes Filter(? 0 ; S) as a subset of S consisting of those members of S which are also models of ? 0 .
tion; we look for a formula which characterizes the set of actions, or plan, that accounts for or obtains the observations. Often would be a disjunction of expressions each of which characterizes an alternative explanation or plan.
He lists two possible model set criteria for the simple case where there are observations but no actions.
{ M 1 = Min( ; Mod(? ? 0 )) { M 2 = Filter(? 0 ; Min( ; Mod(?)))
While comparing them, he rst says:
The de nition of M 2 however has an intuitive appeal: since Min( ; Mod(?)) is the set of all possible developments in the world regardless of any observations, it would make sense to take the whole set and \ lter" it with the given observations.
He then has a discussion and an example and concludes:
Based on this discussion and example, we suggest that the de nition of M 2 is the one which should be used for identifying model sets in piecewise continuous worlds, and as the rst step in the de nition of semantic entailment there. The term lter preferential entailment is proposed for semantic entailment using the de nition of M 2 as its model set criterium.
He then considers the case where action occurrences are present, and uses an additional preference condition and proposes the following model set criterium:
Min( ; Filter(? 0 ; Min( ; Mod(?))));
where only compares interpretations with the same action set, and compares interpretations according to the preference of their respective action sets.
The notion of ltering and lter preferential entailment has played a crucial role in subsequent works over the next decade by Sandewall and his colleagues and students at Linkoping University. In Chapter 16 of his book, he discusses the use of CIRC( ; ; )^ and similar formulations KL94, Lin95, CE92] where only part of the theories are circumscribed (as opposed to a circumscription of the theory as a whole) in solving the frame problem where there is no separation theorem backing its use. He refers to this as forced separation.
His notion of forced separation can be viewed as a special case of ltering where the models of CIRC( ; ; ) are ltered by .
In that chapter Shanahan gives several objections against using forced separation, but nevertheless mentions many instances where forced separation has been used and how it can be used to produce elegant solutions to the frame problem. In his own words (Page 308, Section 16.3):
Those who are unimpressed by these objections to forced separation can exploit the idea to produce other elegant solutions to the frame problem. This section presents a version of the circumscriptive event calculus in which the forced separation approach is deployed. The result is a much simpler formulation than that of Chapters Fourteen and Fifteen, and is closer in some respects to the logic programming formulation in Chapter Thirteen. Rei80] . Basically, the constraints are used to lter the theory. In case of default logic, they represent constraints by default rules with empty consequents (or false as the consequent) and in case of logic programs constraints are represented using rules with empty head (or false in the head).
Baral and Gelfond also represent observations as constraints in their logic programming formulation in BG97] and Baral, Gabaldon and Provetti in BGP98b,BGP98a] use nested circumscription to formulate narratives.
Relating ltering and abductive reasoning: Motivations
Besides the fact that both ltering and abductive reasoning are used for assimilating observations, our motivations to study the relationship between the two are as follows:
(i) Many of the papers that use ltering (that are mentioned in the previous section) use formal terms, such as`explanation', from abductive reasoning, without giving any formal results linking their formulation using ltering to abductive reasoning. Our impression after reading these papers were that they were doing some form of abductive reasoning; but we could not nd any formal result linking abductive reasoning to ltering. This motivated us to look for a formal connection.
(ii) We would like to know when abductive reasoning with respect to a theory and a set of observations is equivalent to using ltering of the models of the theory by the observations. Knowing these conditions is useful in many ways:
{ Using these conditions, we would be able to know if indeed the use of ltering in the papers mentioned in the previous section, results in abductive reasoning.
{ Filtering seems to have more e cient implementations.
We are aware of two systems ELM + 98,NS96] that are extremely fast at generating (stable) models of logic programs with constraints, and often use the constraints in the generation process itself to eliminate a large number of models, that would have violated constraints. These systems can be (and have been) used for ltering with respect to logic programs. In particular, the smodels system has been used to do planning DNK97] in times that are competitive to the best planners available. Although, we are aware of a few abductive systems DD97,KM97], there has not been a systematic comparison of their performance with respect to other systems.
{ Thus knowing when abductive reasoning can be done using ltering, we can formulate our theory appropriately so that we can do abductive reasoning and the corresponding knowledge assimilation using ltering. This provides us with an alternative way to do abductive reasoning.
(iii) When the conditions are satis ed and ltering is equivalent to abductive reasoning, we have additional justi cation for using ltering. Recall that we mentioned in the previous subsection about Shanahan's objections to forced separation, his term for ltering. We hope that equivalence to abductive reasoning will overcome some of his objections.
(iv) We can also study what kind of reasoning happens with ltering when the conditions are not satis ed. Does ltering under those circumstances still makes sense?
1.3 Organization of the rest of the paper: a summary of contributions
In Section 2 we formally de ne simple abductive entailment and ltering. In Section 3 we give generic conditions on theories that guarantee the equivalence of abductive reasoning and lter entailment. In Section 4 we develop speci c su ciency conditions that satisfy the generic conditions, for the equivalence when the theories are rst-order theories, circumscriptive theories, disjunctive logic programs, and default theories. We show that the transformed theory obtained by Console et al. in CDT91] satis es our conditions, and hence ltering with respect to it (by just adding the observations, as it is a monotonic theory) is equivalent to abductive reasoning.
In Section 5 we show that the generic conditions of Section 3 are also necessary for the equivalence of abductive reasoning and lter entailment. In Section 6 we consider abductive entailment and ltering in presence of preference criteria and expand on the generic conditions to guarantee equivalence in this case. In Section 7 we de ne a weaker notion of abductive reasoning and show its equivalence with ltering under less restrictive conditions. In Section 8 we conclude and brie y discuss future directions; in particular, the consequences of removing some of the restrictions made in the paper while de ning abductive reasoning.
Basic De nitions: Simple abduction and Filtering
The main notion in abductive reasoning is the notion of explanations. Given a theory T in a language with an entailment relation`j =' and an observation Obs, an explanation is normally (for example in Section 17.6 of Sha97] and in Section 1 of CDT91] ) de ned as a formula , such that T is consistent (i.e., it has a model) and T j = Obs. In addition, most often { including the above mentioned papers, there is a restriction placed on that it be made of abducible predicates. Thereafter in many works, preference relations between explanation formulas are de ned and used to de ne preferred or minimal explanations.
Instead of using abducible predicates (as in Sha97,CDT91,KKT93], we make a slight generalization and use ground abducible literals, but make a restriction 2 that if an atom is abducible so is its negation. This set of ground abducible literals, which we will also refer to as abducibles, is denoted by Abd, and the atoms in this set are referred to by Abd a .
In our formulation instead of de ning explanations as formulas, we de ne them as (complete) interpretations of the abducibles. Since our ultimate goal is to de ne abductive entailment, not just to de ne explanations, this is not a limitation when the theory is in classical logic, possibly augmented with circumscription. Moreover, by having explanations as interpretations of the abducibles, it is easier to de ne sophisticated model theoretic preference ordering between explanations. This requirement of explanations being a complete subset of abducibles, could be a limitation when the theory is a logic program or a default theory. (For example, EGL97] does not have such a restriction.) But even in this case our formulation is useful and non-trivial, as we will use 2 Although we use a more general notion of abducibles than Sha97,CDT91,KKT93], it would be interesting to extend the results in this paper for the more general case obtained by lifting the restriction that if an atom is abducible then so is its negation. it (in Sections 4.2 and 4.3) to show the lter abducibility of several logic programming and default theory based formulations Tur97,BG97,MT95,MT97] of reasoning about actions. In these formulations, each model corresponds to the evolution of the real state of the world, and the abducibles correspond to the value of uents in the initial state of the world. Thus each potential explanation needs to be a complete interpretation of the abducibles.
Similar to abducibles, we will have a set of ground atoms denoted by Obs a , which we will call observable atoms. Any formula constructed using atoms in Obs a , and logical connectives will be referred to as an observable formula. By Obs, we will denote the set of all observable formulas. We will often refer to Obs as the set of observables, an element of Obs as an observation, and denote the set of ground literals in Obs as Obs l .
In this simpler form, abduction can now be thought of as a method of reasoning which given a knowledge base T { whose language contains the atoms in Abd a and Obs a , and an observation Q, nds possible explanations of Q in terms of a complete subset 3 of the abducibles.
We would now like to formally de ne explanations and abductive entailment. In this paper T denotes a possibly non-monotonic theory. In particular we will be considering (i) extended and disjunctive logic programs, (ii) default theories, and (iii) theories in propositional and rst-order logic possibly augmented with circumscription. For each of these theories, we will now list what is meant by a model, what observations are allowed and how entailment is de ned.
{ In case of a disjunctive logic program (or an extended logic program), bỳ model' we will mean an answer set GL91]. When T is a disjunctive logic program, observations (Q) are allowed to be a (possibly in nite) collection of ground formulas, constructed using atoms in Obs a , and classical logic connectives. Q may be represented by a set of formulas Q f with variables, where the variables serve as schema variables and are substituted with ground terms in the language to obtain Q. We say an answer set A entails a formula F if A entails F in the sense of classical logic. We say a disjunctive logic program T entails Q { denoted by T j = Q { if all answer sets of T entail all formulas in Q.
Given a set of literals L and a logic program T, by T L we mean the logic program T fl : l 2 Lg.
{ In case of a default theory, by`model' we will mean consequences of an extension. The allowed observations (Q) is as in the previous case. We say 3 We say a set S is a complete set w.r.t. Abd, i for any atom a in Abd a { the set of atoms in Abd, either a or :a is in S. Often, we will just say S is complete.
an extension E entails a formula F if E entails F in the sense of classical logic. We say a default theory T entails Q { denoted by T j = Q { if all extensions of T entail all formulas in Q.
{ In case of propositional theory (or a rst order theory) { possibly augmented with circumscription, by`model' we will mean a classical model. The allowed observations (Q) are formulas in propositional logic (or rst order logic) and entailment between T and Q is the classical entailment relation.
Given a set of formulas Q and a classical theory T = fT 1 ; : : : ; T n g, where each T i is a classical theory (possibly augmented with circumscription) by T Q we will mean the theory fQ; T 1 ; : : : ; T n g.
De nition 1 (Explanation) Let T be a (possibly nonmonotonic) theory with an entailment relation j =, and Q be an observation. A complete set of abducibles E (from Abd) is said to be an explanation of Q w.r.t. a theory T
if T E j = Q and T E is consistent (i.e., it has a model).
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We would now like to de ne abductive entailment (j = abd ) with respect to a pair hT; Qi, which we refer to as an abductive theory.
De nition 2 (Abductive Entailment) (i) M is a model of hT; Qi if there
exists an explanation E of Q w.r.t. T such that M is a model of T E.
(ii) For any formula f, hT; Qi j = abd f if f is true in all models of hT; Qi. 2 Note that in this paper by abductive reasoning we refer to reasoning using the abductive entailment relation j = abd de ned above. Proposition 1 Abductive theories are monotonic with respect to addition of observations.
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Proof: Suppose we have Q 1 Q 2 . Then any explanation of Q 2 with respect to T is an explanation of Q 1 with respect to T. Thus models of hT; Q 2 i are models of hT; Q 1 i and hence, j = abd is monotonic with respect to Q.
De nition 3 Let T be a (possibly nonmonotonic) theory and Q be an observation. By Filter(T; Q), we refer to the set of models of T which entail Q. 2
Proposition 2 Entailment with respect to Filter(T; Q) is monotonic with respect to Q. 2
Proof: Follows directly from the de nition of Filter(T; Q).
3 Abductive Reasoning through ltering { Main results
The main goal of this paper is to identify conditions on theories, abducibles and observables such that abductive reasoning can be done through ltering. We now formally de ne such triplets.
De nition 4 (Filter-abducible) A theory T, a set Abd, and a set Obs are said to be lter-abducible if for all possible observations Q 2 Obs; Filter(T; Q) is the set of models of hT; Qi. Now let us compare T 1 and T 0 1 and analyze the di erences. Syntactically, the di erence between them is the last four rules of T 0 1 . These four rules guarantee that T 0 1 has at least one model corresponding to each potential explanation (i.e., interpretation of the abducibles). Since unlike during abductive reasoning, during ltering there is no scope to try each potential explanation so as not to miss any explanation, the models of the theory should enumerate the potential explanations. This is missing in T 1 and therefore T 1 is not lter-abducible with respect to the above mentioned Abd and Obs. On the other hand, T 0 1 satis es this criteria and it is lter-abducible with respect to the same Abd and Obs. In the following paragraphs, we precisely state the above mentioned property as condition B. We now discuss additional conditions that may be important.
For ltering to be equivalent to abductive reasoning, each one of the models obtained by ltering a theory T with an observation Q should contain an explanation of the observation. In that case the abducibles in those models consist of an explanation. For that to happen, the theory must be such that the abducibles uniquely determine the observables. If we want to avoid making any restrictions on the observables then the theory must be such that the abducibles uniquely determine the model. These two conditions are precisely stated below as Condition A 0 and Condition A, respectively.
We now formally state the above mentioned conditions. Proof: Follows directly from Lemma 2 and Theorem 1.
The main signi cance of the above corollary is that by requiring the more restrictive condition A we have more exibility with the observables.
We now give some examples where we can verify lter-abducibility by verifying the above mentioned conditions. { If T is a nested abnormality theory (NAT) then we can lter T w.r.t. Q by the NAT consisting of two blocks; one of which is T and the other is Q. As a non-monotonic knowledge representation formalism NAT has the advantage that it makes it easy to have multiple levels of ltering.
Our goal in this section is to develop and describe speci c su ciency conditions that can be used to show lter-abducibility in particular knowledge representation formalisms. The ones we consider are: circumscriptive theories; rst order theories; disjunctive logic programming; and Reiter's default logic. But rst we de ne the notion of a theory encoding a function, which will play an important role when we de ne the speci c su ciency conditions for each of the knowledge representation formalism that we will be considering.
De nition 5 A theory T is said to encode a function (or is functional) from a set of literals, called input, to a set of literals called output if for any complete subset E of input such that T E is consistent, all models of T E agree on the literals from output. Proof:
The proof is based on showing that the if part of the proposition implies the conditions A 0 (i, ii, and iii) and B. 
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We now discuss two examples whose lter-abducibility can be deduced using Proposition 3. Since T 3 is a rst order theory, using Proposition 3 we can conclude that T 3 does not encode a function from Abd to Obs. Indeed we can verify this by considering the input E = f:q(a); :q(b)g. If we were to allow disjunctions in the right hand side of the clauses, and/or not require the clauses to be hierarchical, we can no longer guarantee that T c will be functional from abducibles to observable literals. As a result we will not have a guarantee that T c will be lter-abducible.
For example, let T be p ! a _ b. Then T c will be p $ a _ b. Suppose we observe a, then using deduction with respect to T c we will conclude p as an explanation. But p is not an explanation of a with respect to T. The fact that T c is not functional from fp; :pg to fa; b; :a; :bg, warns us to not expect T c to be lter-abducible with respect to them.
{ Proposition 3 also suggests ways to extend the results of Console et al.
If we can nd a larger class of T, abducibles, or observables such that T c will be functional from abducibles to observable literals then we will have a more general result.
A simple generalization is the case, where we allow observables to include the abducibles. Since T c remains functional from abducibles to (the expanded) observable literals the lter-abducibility result still holds.
We will now give an example from the domain of reasoning about actions, where we have lter-abducibility.
Filter-abducibility of action theories
Let us consider a subset of the action description language A GL93] where a domain descriptions may have two kinds of propositions: initial value propositions and e ect propositions. We will refer to this language as A 0 . (The alphabet of A 0 consists of three disjoint nonempty sets of symbols called uents, actions, and situations. We will also assume that S 0 is one of the situations in the language of A 0 and by a uent literal we will mean a uent possibly preceded by :.)
An initial value proposition is a proposition of the form initially F where F is a uent literal.
An e ect proposition is a proposition of the form A causes F if P 1 ; : : : P n where F; P 1 ; : : : ; P n are uent literals and A is an action. We refer to fP 1 ; : : : ; P n g as the precondition of the above e ect proposition.
We will be restricting domain descriptions to collections of e ect propositions and initial value propositions such that for any two e ect propositions that describe the e ect of the same action a on complementary f's, and have P 1 ; : : : ; P n and Q 1 ; : : : ; Q m as their preconditions we have that fP 1 ; : : : ; P n g \ fQ 1 ; : : : ; Q m g 6 = ;
. ( (7)H(P 1 ; s)^: : :^H(P n ; s) Causes +(?) (A; F; s) (for each A causes (:)F if P 1 ; : : : ; P n 2 D) g
In the above theory let us have Abd a as the set of atoms using Initially and Obs a as the set of atoms using Holds. By showing that the above theory is functional from abducibles to observable literals, we can use Proposition 3 7 to conclude that assimilation of observations with respect to the above theory can be done by simply adding the observation to the theory.
Let us now brie y argue why the above theory is functional from abducibles to observable literals. From axiom (4) it is clear that given a complete set of Initially' literals, we have a unique (and complete) set of Holds literals at the situation s 0 , in all models of the theory. We will now argue that given a complete set of Holds literals at the situation s, for any action A, there is a unique (and complete) set of Holds literals at the situation Res(A; s), in all models of the theory. (A detailed proof of this is given in BGP98a] .)
The NAT block de ning Causes +(?) guarantees that given a complete set of`Holds' literals at a situation s, we have a unique (and complete) set of Causes +(?) literals at the situation s, w.r.t. any action A, and any uent F. Because of our restrictions on domain descriptions, we will never have Causes + (a; f; s) and Causes ? (a; f; s; ) to be true in the same model. This fact together with the axioms (1) -(3) guarantee that given a complete set of Holds literals at any situation s, and for any action A, there is a unique (and complete) set of Holds literals at the situation Res(A; s) in all models of the theory.
Thus SC c is functional from its abducibles to its observable literals and hence it is lter abducible.
Filter abducibility of Disjunctive Logic Programs
In this subsection we will discuss the lter-abducibility of disjunctive logic programs. In particular, we will give some su ciency conditions that guarantee that conditions A 0 and B holds. But rst, for the sake of completeness, we will give the de nitions and results related to the notion of splitting LT94] which will be used in the su ciency conditions. 
De nition 6 (Splitting set) LT94]
A splitting set for a program is any set U of literals such that, for every rule r 2 , if head(r) \U 6 = ; then lit(r) U. If U is a splitting set for , we also say that U splits . The set of rules r 2 such that lit(r) U is called the bottom of relative to the splitting set U and denoted by bot U ( ). The subprogram n bot U ( ) is called the top of relative to U. 
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We are now ready to give su ciency conditions that guarantee lterabducibility for disjunctive logic programs.
Proposition 4 An extended logic program T is lter-abducible with respect to abducibles Abd and observables Obs if (i) T is functional from Abd to Obs l ,
(ii) for all l; :l 2 Abd, l _ :l is in T, and (iii) Abd is a splitting set for T. 2
Proof:
We prove this by showing that the conditions (i) { (ii) above imply the conditions A 0 and B which in turn guarantee lter abducibility of a theory. The translation of an e{proposition \a causes f if p 1 ; : : : ; p n " consists of (2a) h(f; res(a; S)) h(p 1 ; S); : : : ; h(p n ; S) (2b) ab(a; f; S) h(p 1 ; S); : : : ; h(p n ; S)
where for a uent g, h(g; s) denotes the literal holds(g; s) and h(:g; s) denotes the literal :holds(g; s).
The e ect axiom allows us to prove that f will hold after a, if the preconditions are satis ed.
Initial value proposition
An initial proposition \ initially f" is translated as To assimilate observations of the form \f after a 1 ; : : : ; a m " we need to lter the above logic program. In logic programming ltering can be done using integrity constraints (or through clauses with empty heads). Thus in this case assimilation is done by adding integrity constraints of the form below to the logic program. 
Filter abducibility of Default theories
Su ciency conditions for the lter-abducibility of Reiter's default theory is very similar to the su ciency conditions for disjunctive logic programs that we gave in the last subsection. In Section 3 we show that the conditions A 0 and B are su cient for lterabducibility. In this section we show that they are also necessary. 
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We would like to mention that the known ways to satisfy condition B in default theories and logic programs are to have rules of the form l _ :l (or have two rules of the form l not :l; :l not l) for all abducible atoms l in logic programs and defaults of of the form :l l and ::l :l for all abducible atoms l in default theories. (The former was rst used in Ino91] to relate semantics of abductive logic programs { based on the generalized stable models KM90], and extended logic programs. The later was used in Tur97, MT93] .) Hence the necessity of condition B for lter-abducibility makes it necessary (to the best of our knowledge) to have such rules and defaults in lter-abducible logic programs and default theories, respectively.
Preferential abductive reasoning and Filtering
So far we have considered simple abductive reasoning and ltering. But often (as in San89]) both abductive reasoning and ltering is accompanied by some preference criteria. In this section we extend the de nition of abductive entailment to preferential abductive entailment and also extend the de nition of ltering to preferential ltering. We then give conditions (su ciency) when they are equivalent. We now de ne preferential abductive entailment and preferential ltering.
De nition 9 (Preferential abductive entailment) Suppose Several instances of ltering used in the literature that de ne an intuitively meaningful entailment relation do not satisfy the conditions described earlier in this paper. In particular, when actions have non-deterministic e ects (as in Tur97]) ltering may still make intuitive sense, but our current de nition of abductive reasoning is too strong to match the entailment de ned through ltering. The following example illustrates our point. In this paper we gave conditions on theories that guarantee the equivalence of particular kinds of abductive reasoning and ltering for assimilation of observations into theories. We also showed why these conditions are necessary. We gave some su ciency conditions on theories expressed in several knowledge representation formalisms so as to guarantee the equivalence of ltering and abductive reasoning in those formalisms. Finally, we illustrated several examples from the knowledge representation literature where the theories that use ltering indeed satisfy the su ciency conditions and thus can be shown to be encoding abductive reasoning.
One direction of future work is to explore more syntactic and easily veri able su ciency conditions for particular knowledge representation formalisms. It will be also interesting to examine additional formalizations in the literature where ltering is used and examine if indeed some form of abductive reasoning is encoded there.
Another important direction of future work would be to broaden the results in this paper, where we remove some of the restrictions imposed on the notion of abductive reasoning. (Note that the restrictions imposed are important in their own right as they lead us to show the relation between abductive reasoning and ltering in several formulations of reasoning about actions in the literature.) In particular, when the theory is a disjunctive logic program or a default theory, it would be interesting to broaden the notion of explanations, to allow incomplete subset of the abducibles. Such a notion of abductive reasoning in default theories is de ned in EGL97].
To do abductive reasoning using ltering in this case, the theory should be again such that its models enumerate the various possible explanations.
Suppose Abd = fp; :pg. Now that we intend to allow explanations to be incomplete subset of the abducibles, the set of possible explanations will ffpg; f:pg; fgg. Since stable models are minimal sets, there does not exist a logic program whose models will be these three possible explanations. The minimality condition will eliminate the rst two, in presence of the third. One way to overcome this would be to use a special uent u p (meaning uncommitted about p) to represent the third explanation. In the sequel we plan to verify if indeed ltering using the above rules and/or defaults lead us to achieving a more general notion of abductive reasoning.
